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Abstract
Current debates about the integration of traditional and academic ecological knowl-
edge (TEK and AEK) struggle with a dilemma of division and assimilation. On the 
one hand, the emphasis on differences between traditional and academic perspec-
tives has been criticized as creating an artificial divide that brands TEK as “non-
scientific” and contributes to its marginalization. On the other hand, there has been 
increased concern about inadequate assimilation of Indigenous and other traditional 
perspectives into scientific practices that disregards the holistic nature and values of 
TEK. The aim of this article is to develop a practice-based account of the epistemic 
relations between TEK and AEK that avoids both horns of the dilemma. While rela-
tions between TEK and AEK are often described in terms of the “holistic” nature 
of the former and the “mechanistic” character of the latter, we argue that a simple 
holism–mechanism divide misrepresents the epistemic resources of both TEK and 
AEK. Based on the literature on mechanistic explanations in philosophy of science, 
we argue that holders of TEK are perfectly capable of identifying mechanisms that 
underlie ecological phenomena while AEK often relies on non-mechanistic strate-
gies of dealing with ecological complexity. Instead of generic characterizations of 
knowledge systems as either mechanistic or holistic, we propose to approach epis-
temic relations between knowledge systems by analyzing their (partly mechanistic 
and partly holistic) heuristics in practice.
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Introduction
Indigenous, local, and traditional ecological knowledge (IEK, LEK, TEK) are 
increasingly recognized in the biological and environmental sciences but also raise 
fundamental methodological questions about the limits of knowledge integration. 
On the one hand, Indigenous scholars have emphasized the importance of TEK for 
understanding and managing local environments (Cajete 2000; Pierotti and Wildcat 
2000; Wilson 2008) and have contributed to growing debates about “co-creation”, 
“co-management”, “participation”, and “transdisciplinarity” (Berkes 2018; Chap-
man et al. 2016; Hadorn et al. 2006; Parsons et al. 2016) in areas such as agriculture 
and conservation. By attacking what Agrawal (1995) has called the “divide between 
Indigenous and scientific knowledge”, these accounts typically combine epistemic 
and political concerns (Whyte 2018). Holders of TEK are epistemically recognized 
as experts (Byskov 2017) about local environments and this expertise is mobilized 
to challenge their political marginalization (Scott 1998; Shepherd 2006; White 
2014) in negotiations of practice and policy.
On the other hand, attempts to integrate TEK into institutionalized science often 
create tensions with its definitional feature of being part of the heritage of spe-
cific communities. While there is a well-established academic consensus about the 
relevance of TEK in the biological and environmental sciences, the line between 
integration and assimilation is often far from clear. For example, El-Hani and de 
Ferreira Bandeira (2008: 7) warn that emphasis on the scientific character of TEK 
can lead to a loss of “the distinctiveness of other ways of knowing, and, also, their 
epistemic value in terms of their own validation criteria.” Related concerns are artic-
ulated in Nadasdy’s (2003) influential critique of integration projects that run the 
risk of extracting “scientifically useful” information from TEK while marginalizing 
(e.g. ethical and spiritual) aspects that do not fit the agendas (Castleden et al. 2017), 
methods (Marlor 2010), and ontologies (Ludwig 2018) of scientists.
The result seems to be a dilemma of division and assimilation in which either 
the epistemic potential or unique character of TEK becomes misrepresented through 
inadequate framing. For example, consider projects that aim to integrate TEK of 
Indigenous hunters with academic ecological knowledge (AEK)1 of conservation 
scientists. Indigenous hunters will often possess a lot of relevant expertise and may 
be best equipped to monitor vulnerable populations, identify causes of population 
decline, detect changes in ecological dynamics, identify requirements of sustainable 
1 There is no terminological agreement about Indigenous, local, and traditional ecological knowledge 
(IEK, LEK, TEK) (e.g. see Ingold and Kurttila 2000 on problems with the label “traditional”) and there 
is even less clarity about contrasting labels such as academic, scientific, and Western ecological knowl-
edge (AEK, SEK, WEK). While AEK is not the most common label, it has advantages over SEK or 
WEK for current purposes. In contrast with SEK, AEK avoids boundary disputes and does not defini-
tionally exclude TEK from qualifying as scientific. Furthermore, we prefer AEK over WEK because 
the issues of this article reflect not so much Western origin but rather academic institutionalization of 
knowledge systems. Knowledge “in the West” can be deeply entangled with traditions of particular local 
communities in Europe (e.g. Svanberg et al. 2011) and North America (e.g. Nolan 2007). Furthermore, 
knowledge “outside of the West” can become institutionalized in academic contexts with little connec-
tion to the traditions of a specific community.
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hunting, and so on (Ens et al. 2015; Weiss et al. 2013). However, much of this exper-
tise will also often be entangled with spiritual values and worldviews that diverge 
substantially from academic approaches to conservation management (Barbour and 
Schlesinger 2012). Treating holders of TEK as “collaborators” who can contribute 
evidence to AEK “just like scientists” therefore runs the risk of obscuring or com-
pletely missing core aspects of TEK.
The aim of this article is to develop an account that relates the epistemic 
resources of TEK and AEK while avoiding both horns of the dilemma of assimila-
tion and division. Debates about the relations between TEK and AEK commonly 
start by characterizing the former as “holistic” and the latter as “reductionistic” or 
“mechanistic” (Aikenhead and Ogawa 2007; Dods 2004; Wood 1999). While such 
characterizations can convey important insights, this article argues that a simple 
holism–mechanism divide misrepresents the epistemic resources of both TEK and 
AEK. The following section emphasizes that holders of TEK are perfectly capable 
of identifying mechanisms that underlie ecological phenomena. Using the litera-
ture on mechanistic explanations in philosophy of science, we reinterpret Lansing’s 
(1991) classical case study of rice farming in Bali and argue that the neglect of TEK 
about ecological mechanisms turned out to be both epistemically inadequate and 
politically problematic. While holders of TEK can identify ecological mechanisms, 
the second half of the article emphasizes that TEK also often employs strategies 
that are holistic in two distinct meanings of the term. First, TEK commonly involves 
a methodological holism that avoids decompositional analysis and rather addresses 
dynamics of ecosystems as “wholes”. Second, Indigenous scholars often character-
ize TEK as holistic in a broader sense that emphasizes metaphysical, spiritual, and 
ethical dimensions of interrelatedness and reciprocity. The conclusion returns to the 
issue of differences between TEK or AEK by developing both a critical diagnosis 
and a constructive proposal. We argue that the prevalence of mechanistic resources 
in TEK and of holistic strategies in AEK undermines a simple holism–mechanism 
divide. Instead, we propose a more fine-grained analysis of heuristics in TEK and 
AEK that provides resources for engaging with both similarities and differences in a 
more substantial way that can inform negotiations of ecological knowledge between 
diverse stakeholders.
Identifying and managing mechanisms with TEK
While it has become widely agreed that there is no simple demarcation criterion 
that distinguishes TEK and AEK (Agrawal 2014; Drouin-Gagné 2014; Gorelick 
2014; Whyte 2013), acknowledgment of substantial differences between knowledge 
systems is often a requirement of adequate and respectful engagement with TEK. 
A common strategy of describing differences is to contrast the “holistic” nature of 
TEK with the “mechanistic” or “reductionistic” character of AEK or Western sci-
ence more generally. Furthermore, this contrast often motivates a wider framing 
according to which “traditional knowledge [constitutes] a challenge to the positivist-
reductionist paradigm in Western science” (Berkes 2018: 20) as it generates under-
standing of local environments and sustainable practices in a holistic way.
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This article focuses on mechanisms rather than reductionism, as a generic charac-
terization of Western science as “reductionistic” is clearly insufficient for a nuanced 
analysis of epistemic strategies in TEK and AEK. While reductions can be impor-
tant epistemic strategies in scientific practice (Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010), it has 
been commonly noted in philosophical debates (Brigandt 2010; Kellert et al. 2006; 
Ruphy 2016) that science is often not reductionistic in practice. Furthermore, limita-
tions of reductionist perspectives have been especially prominent in the life sciences 
(Brigandt and Love 2017; Kaiser 2015) and debates about different levels of organi-
zation have even been characterized in terms of an “anti-reductionist consensus” in 
philosophy of biology (see Waters 1990; Griffiths and Stotz 2013).
While a general characterization of AEK as reductionistic would be based on an 
simplistic picture of “Western science”, a focus on mechanisms constitutes a more 
promising starting point. Mechanistic approaches have been extraordinarily influen-
tial in recent philosophy of science, in part because they are framed as an alterna-
tive to traditional reductionist programs (Andersen 2014; Craver 2007; Fehr 2004). 
While many “New Mechanists” (Levy 2013; Franklin-Hall 2016) reject traditional 
reductionism and stress the importance of components across multiple levels of 
organization, they still focus on explanatory strategies that can be plausibly con-
trasted with holistic perspectives in TEK. Most importantly, mechanistic approaches 
involve decompositional analyses of “parts whose activities and interactions are 
responsible for the phenomena” (Illari and Glennan 2017: 1). Even if mechanistic 
philosophers do not assume that a target phenomenon can be completely reduced 
to a lower level of composing parts, the mechanistic focus on interacting sub-com-
ponents suggests an attractive contrast with holistic perspectives on ecosystems “as 
wholes” that are commonly emphasized in TEK.
For example, an academically trained ecologist may analyze a target phenomenon 
such as the spread of an agricultural pest in terms of a mechanism of interacting 
components (e.g. intensification and monocropping that create a favorable habitat for 
a pest, loss of biodiversity that reduces prevalence of parasites and predators of the 
pest, development of pesticide resistances). In contrast, holders of TEK may employ 
pest management strategies (e.g. ethical and spiritual requirements of engagement 
with a forest, agricultural norms regarding polyculture or cropping schedules) in 
their agroecological systems that are effective even if they do not aim for an expla-
nation of how different components interact in creating pest vulnerability. This way, 
both TEK and AEK can guide effective strategies of pest management even if they 
employ very different epistemic strategies.
While this contrast between holistic and mechanistic approaches has some prima 
facie plausibility, it provides an overly simple picture of the epistemic resources of 
both TEK and AEK. This section develops the argument that a limitation of mecha-
nistic analysis to AEK obscures the capacities of TEK to identify mechanisms of 
complex ecological phenomena. Holders of TEK are not only capable of identify-
ing mechanisms of complex ecological dynamics but also of intervening in them 
through equally complex management strategies. Taking the epistemic resources of 
holders of TEK seriously therefore also requires to recognize that the identification 
of mechanisms is not exclusive to AEK or Western science more generally.
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Developing a more adequate account of the scope of mechanistic perspectives 
in TEK and AEK requires some specifications of what is meant with “mecha-
nism”. Mechanism talk has become ubiquitous in recent philosophy of science 
and is used to develop heterogenous frameworks and with very different agendas 
(Levy 2013; Nicholson 2012). In its most ambitious interpretation, mechanistic 
perspectives are associated with what Dijksterhuis (1961) famously described as 
the “The Mechanization of the World Picture” in early modern science in Europe. 
Given such an appeal to what Nicholson (2012) calls “mechanicism”, it is not 
only obvious that TEK is non-mechanistic but also questionable whether cur-
rent trends in AEK can be adequately described as mechanistic (Berkes 2018). 
However, substantial parts of mechanistic philosophy of science focus on specific 
epistemic strategies rather than these more general debates about “mechanistic 
worldviews”. For example, Machamer et al.’s (2000) landmark article develops a 
mechanistic framework with examples from molecular biology and neurobiology. 
Their guiding questions are what it means for molecular biologists to refer to the 
“mechanism of DNA replication” or for neurobiologists to refer to the “mech-
anism of chemical neurotransmission”. In both cases, Machamer et  al. argue 
that scientists’ appeals to mechanisms reflect a distinct epistemic strategy that 
involves “entities and activities, organized such that they are productive of regu-
lar changes” (2000: 1). Applied to the relation between AEK and TEK, the ques-
tion is therefore not whether holders of TEK subscribe to a “mechanistic world-
view” (they don’t) but rather whether they also employ this distinctive epistemic 
strategy that has become commonly emphasized in scientific practice.
Illari and Williamson’s (2012) proposal of a general account of mechanisms 
helps to further specify these issues. While there has been little agreement on a 
general definition of “mechanism”, Illari and Williamson aim to provide a mini-
mal account of core components by stating that a “mechanism for a phenomenon 
consists of entities and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible 
for the phenomenon” (2012: 120). This definition includes three components that 
can be illustrated with Machamer et al.’s examples of DNA replication and chem-
ical neurotransmission: First, mechanisms are composed of entities and activities. 
For example, the mechanism of DNA replication is composed of entities such 
as the double helix and base pairs as well as activities such as the unwinding 
of former and bonding of the latter. The mechanism of chemical neurotransmis-
sion is composed of entities such as neurotransmitter molecules and post-synaptic 
neurons as well as activities such as the release of the former and the depolariza-
tion of the latter. Second, mechanisms require the organization of these entities 
and activities into a mechanism. Both DNA replication and chemical neurotrans-
mission are clearly not produced by an unordered set of entities and activities 
but rather by their intricate organization. Third, entities and activities have to be 
organized so that they are responsible for the target phenomenon. For example, 
organized entities such as the double helix and base pairs and activities such as 
their unwinding and bonding constitute a mechanism that is responsible for the 
target phenomenon of DNA replication. Target phenomena and their mechanisms 
stand in clear relations of dependency in the sense that the former are responsible 
for the latter.
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Illari and Williamson’s account of mechanisms is intended to be broadly applica-
ble in scientific practice for case studies from social psychology to astrophysics. It 
expresses the assumption that researchers in very different disciplines share a broad 
epistemic strategy that analyzes the organization of entities and activities that are 
responsible for target phenomena. Given this broad characterization for application 
in different disciplines, it becomes possible to see how not only AEK but also TEK 
can involve mechanistic epistemic strategies. Holders of TEK are often not only 
aware of many of the entities and activities that are involved in ecological dynam-
ics but also of how the specifics of their organization are responsible for a target 
phenomenon. Furthermore, it is often precisely this intimate knowledge of entities, 
activities, and their organization that puts holders of TEK in the position to man-
age local environments by intervening in local mechanisms. The following section 
develops these claims in the context of Lansing’s (1991) classical case study of TEK 
about rice farming in Bali and of the marginalization of this knowledge in the wake 
of the Green Revolution.
Organizing mechanisms through water temples
Lansing’s (1991) work on pest control and water management in Balinese rice 
farming has become widely recognized as a classical case study both of the com-
plexity of TEK and of its marginalization for the sake of allegedly rational agri-
cultural modernization. As Lansing emphasizes in the introduction of his Priests 
and Programmers, his research in Bali was originally designed as a much more 
traditional anthropological study of the historical development of Balinese temples 
but the “fieldwork happened to coincide with a phenomenon that seemed at first to 
have nothing whatever to do with temples: the onset of the ‘Green Revolution’ in 
Balinese agriculture” (1991: 3). The Green Revolution swept Indonesia in the early 
1970s enforcing dramatic changes in rice farming in Bali such as the replacement 
of traditional varieties of rice with new cultivars that promised quicker maturation 
and higher yields. Achieving these yields did not only require new seeds but also a 
fundamental transformation of agricultural practices that mandated intensive use of 
fertilizers and pesticides as well as the abandonment of traditional cropping and irri-
gation patterns. While these patterns used to be determined by communities in the 
context of religious ceremonies of water temples, the new system mandated continu-
ous rice cropping with a new cycle starting immediately after the harvest.
As Lansing documents in detail, this new system had disastrous consequences for 
local farmers and threatened their livelihoods by leading to water shortages and pest 
outbreaks: The rice variety IR-8 turned out to be susceptible to the brown planthop-
per and massive crop damage motivated a shift to the planthopper-resistant variety 
IR-36. However, IR-36 was affected by an explosion of the tungro virus that lead 
to the adoption of PB-50 which was affected by an outbreak and rapid spread of 
Helminthosporium oryzae. “Thus by the mid-1980s, Balinese farmers had become 
locked into a struggle to stay one step ahead of the next rice pest by planting the 
latest resistant variety of Green Revolution rice” (Lansing 1991: 115). Against the 
backdrop of this modernization failure, Lansing’s investigation of Balinese TEK 
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focused on the role of water temples in coordinating a complex system of irrigation 
and cropping. His analysis of water management and pest control provides a clear 
case of the capacity of TEK to identify mechanisms of complex ecological dynam-
ics and to intervene in these mechanisms through adaptive management strategies. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the Balinese system of water management and 
pest control in rice farming can be understood along Illari and Williamson’s three 
criteria of (1) entities and activities, (2) organization, (3) responsibility for the target 
phenomenon.
First, traditional Balinese rice farming involves a range of entities and activities 
that can be described as constituting a mechanism for water management and pest 
control. Important entities include water temples and subaks, i.e. groups of roughly 
a hundred rice farmers who share water from a common source. Other relevant enti-
ties include rivers, canals, mountains, rice fields, pests, rice varieties, pesticides, 
villages, priests, Green Revolution engineers, and the regional government. Many 
relevant activities and processes can be identified in relation to these entities. For 
example, seasonally variable flow of water in the main rivers, the use of temples to 
coordinate the flow of water in partly synchronized irrigation and fallow patterns, 
scheduling of cropping activities, spraying of pesticides, and government mandates 
for certain agricultural activities.
Second, water management and pest control needs to be understood through 
the organization of these entities and activities into coordinated (or dysfunctional) 
systems. Indeed, water flows in Bali had been carefully engineered and organized 
through Balinese TEK. One of Lansing’s core findings was that pest control through 
Balinese TEK was largely achieved through synchronization of fallow periods that 
prevented the spread of pests such as rodents and insects as well as bacterial and 
viral diseases. By replacing the coordinating functions of water temples with a sys-
tem of immediate replanting after the harvest, Green Revolution engineers created 
a desynchronized cropping schedule in which “migrating pests moved across the 
landscape consuming one harvest after another” (Lansing 1991: xxii). However, 
synchronization of irrigation and fallowing schedules has its limitations in Bali as 
synchronization across all subaks would create water shortages during peak irriga-
tion demands. Water temples therefore turned out to have a very complex task of 
fine-tuning the water flow in a way that creates sufficient synchronicity to control 
pests but sufficient variation in irrigation schedules to avoid water shortage.
Third, Lansing provides strong evidence that the organization of these enti-
ties and activities is actually responsible for the target phenomena of (successful 
or dysfunctional) water management and pest control. In the case of the traditional 
Balinese system of rice farming, Lansing develops a detailed description of how 
sub-components such as irrigation schedules and fallow periods allowed effective 
water sharing during the dry season and pest control. In the case of novel Green 
Revolution practices, he shows how pest spread and water shortages were caused 
by undermining core components of the old mechanisms and its replacement with 
entirely desynchronized cropping schedules. In this sense, there is a clear case that 
Illari and Williamson’s criterion of “responsibility for the phenomenon” is satisfied.
In addition to this qualitative evidence, a key component of Lansing’s Priests and 
Programmers is a computer simulation that confirms the responsibility of traditional 
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irrigation schedules for creating an adequate balance between pest spread and water 
stress. Along the Oos and Pentau rivers, farmers were divided into 172 subaks that 
formed 14 organizational units through water temples that produced 14 different irri-
gation schedules. Based on data on issues such as seasonal rainfall, water demand 
of subaks, water stress effects on plants, and pest spread, Lansing’s model predicts 
effects of different synchronization scenarios on water stress and pest spread. There 
are clear risks of both over- and under-synchronization. If all 172 subaks follow the 
same irrigation schedule, water stress reaches a maximum. If all 172 subaks follow 
individualized irrigation schedule (as promoted in the Green Revolution), pest dam-
age is maximized. The predictions of the model converge with the actual organiza-
tion of the temple system as 14 internally synchronized schedules provide an opti-
mal balance by minimizing water stress and keeping pests at a comparatively low 
level. In this sense, the computer model provides further evidence that the water 
temple system constitutes a carefully engineered mechanism that is responsible for 
the target phenomena of water management and pest control.
To sum up, Lansing’s analysis clearly demonstrates the capacity of Balinese TEK 
to identify as well as engineer complex ecological mechanisms that meet Illari and 
Williamson’s three criteria of (1) entities and activities, (2) organization, (3) respon-
sibility for the target phenomenon. A limitation of Lansing’s analysis, however, is 
that it says relatively little about how Balinese holders of TEK identify these mecha-
nisms when explaining ecological dynamics. Although Lansing’s own account of 
the Balinese temple system clearly fits common characterizations of mechanistic 
explanation (e.g. Glennan 2002), his discussion does not provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the explanatory strategies that are employed by Balinese holders of TEK. 
While a detailed account of such explanatory strategies in Balinese TEK is miss-
ing, substantial research on causal reasoning has been developed in other contexts of 
TEK. For example, Atran and Medin’s group has engaged with TEK of Itza’ Maya 
and shown how ecological expertise of Itza’ grounds causal reasoning in terms of 
specific ecological mechanisms rather than more generic explanatory strategies 
(Medin and Atran 2007; Bailenson et al. 2002).
The epistemology and politics of identifying mechanisms in TEK
The hypothesis that the identification of mechanisms is an exclusive characteris-
tic of AEK has some intuitive appeal that is largely based on the common contrast 
between the holistic nature of TEK and the mechanistic orientation of Western sci-
ence. However, case studies such as rice farming in Bali show that this hypothesis 
is simply false. The Balinese system of water management and pest control does 
not only illustrate the capacity of Balinese TEK to identify mechanisms of complex 
ecological dynamics but also its ability to engineer these dynamics through complex 
and multi-generational interventions in the mechanisms that produce them.
One of the strengths of Lansing’s analysis is that it does not only illustrate the 
resources of TEK to identify mechanisms that underlie complex ecological dynam-
ics but also the epistemic and political costs of their neglect. Engineers of the Green 
Revolution simply did not recognize the mechanisms that were organized through 
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water temples and Lansing leaves little doubt that this failure was embedded in a 
more general disregard for Balinese TEK: “The answer to pests was pesticide, not 
the prayers of priests. Or as one frustrated American irrigation engineer said to me, 
‘These people don’t need a high priest, they need a hydrologist!’” (Lansing 1991: 
115).
Disregard for Balinese TEK came with entangled epistemological and political 
costs. On the epistemological side, the insufficient recognition of mechanisms that 
were embedded in TEK resulted in a predictive failure in the sense that Green Revo-
lution engineers were unable to anticipate and to respond to water shortages and 
pest outbreaks. Politically, this failure was disastrous for Balinese farmers whose 
harvests were ruined by paternalistic policies that did not even understand what they 
were destroying. As Lansing (1991: 161) describes the situation: “the threat of legal 
penalties against anyone failing to grow the new rice led to continuous cropping of 
Green Revolution rice. Religious rituals continued in the temples, but field rituals no 
longer matched the actual stages of rice growth. As soon as one crop was harvested, 
another was planted, and cropping cycles began to drift apart. During the rainy sea-
son, no one was likely to run out of water. But during the dry season, the supply of 
irrigation water became unpredictable. Soon, district agricultural offices began to 
report ‘chaos in the water scheduling’ and ‘explosions of pest populations,’ as in this 
1985 report by the Department of Public Works of the regency of Tabanan.”
While Lansing’s account of the Green Revolution in Bali can be situated in wider 
controversies about the social effects of agricultural intensification and moderni-
zation (Conway and Barbier 2013; Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013; Horlings and 
Marsden 2011), our analysis aims for a more restricted political lesson. No matter 
whether goals of increasing crop yields through agricultural intensification were jus-
tified, the neglect of epistemic resources of Balinese TEK in the intensification pro-
cess led to adverse effects on the livelihoods of local communities. An overly sim-
ple contrast between an exclusively holistic perspective of TEK and an exclusively 
mechanistic perspective of AEK is therefore not only epistemologically inadequate 
but can also come with very concrete political costs for holders of TEK. In other 
words, the idea that mechanism discovery is exclusively the business of Western sci-
ence and nothing to do with the holistic worldview of TEK runs the risk of produc-
ing entangled epistemic misrepresentations and social injustices by disregarding the 
expertise of local communities and embracing harmful practices.
Limitations of mechanistic approaches in TEK
In a collaborative project that integrates ecology and philosophy of science, Poliseli 
(2018) developed a detailed analysis of the potential of mechanistic approaches in 
AEK. Analyzing an autochthonous bee community in an agricultural pollination 
service in Brazil, Poliseli et al. emphasize the guiding role of heuristics in the con-
struction of their mechanistic model. Understanding heuristics broadly as epistemic 
tools that guide engagement with target phenomena, the project developed a diverse 
toolbox of heuristics that was employed to generate an account of the pollination 
service in terms of underlying mechanisms. For example, Poliseli et al.’s heuristics 
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include phenomenon characterizations that specify explanans and explanandum, 
mechanism sketches that visualize relations within the pollination service, hierarchi-
cal structures that locate components of the explanans at different levels of organi-
zation, and enabling conditions that identify core variables of the mechanisms in the 
pollination service.
Given the arguments from the last section, it will not surprise that some of 
Poliseli et al.’s heuristics are not restricted to AEK but can also be applied in con-
texts of TEK. For example, the complex Balinese system of rice farming requires 
identification of core enabling conditions such as irrigation and cropping schedules 
and tools of visualization have been widely documented in TEK and Indigenous 
knowledge even if they are not formally structured as mechanism sketches (Joyce 
2012; Begossi and Caires 2015). That being said, Poliseli et al. developed their heu-
ristics to guide the development of a specific mechanistic model for a specific eco-
logical phenomenon and does not suggest that their heuristics will be applicable in 
all contexts of AEK or even TEK.
While some TEK heuristics can contribute to a better understanding of mecha-
nisms, this section argues that many TEK heuristics are valuable precisely because 
they circumvent questions about the organization of entities and activities that is 
responsible for a target phenomenon. Mackinson’s (2000) influential study of local 
knowledge of fishery in British Columbia provides a helpful starting point for devel-
oping the argument that avoiding mechanistic perspectives is a productive feature 
of many epistemic strategies in TEK. Based on interviews with First Nations, non-
indigenous fishers, fishery managers, and fishery scientists, Mackinson collected a 
large set of IF … THEN clauses about the behavior of herring shoals and integrated 
them in the expert system CLUPEX. Mackinson refers to these IF … THEN clauses 
as heuristics and emphasizes the expertise of local informants in identifying them. 
Examples of locally communicated heuristics include: “If there is a bright moon the 
fish spread out fast and it is difficult to catch them” and “If weather is bad close to 
spawning then schools get disrupted”. Heuristics in Mackinson’s case study share 
the feature of relating specific attributes such as bird predator type, current strength, 
moonlight, water depth, or weather with equally specific descriptors of herring 
shoals such as size, packing density, depth, shape, cohesion, and movement of the 
shoal. If such relations are consistently and robustly communicated across several 
informants, they are translated into more formalized IF … THEN clauses such as 
“IF time of day is dusk OR night AND state of the moon is full and bright, THEN 
shoal depth mid-range AND packing density very low AND ease of capture very 
low” (Mackinson 2000: 540).
Mackinson’s and Poliseli et  al.’s heuristics differ as the former aim at dynam-
ics of ecosystems at the macro-level without providing an account of underlying 
mechanisms. Poliseli et al.’s heuristics address pollination by developing a detailed 
account of the organization of entities and activities that are responsible for the tar-
get phenomenon. Their case study therefore illustrates how AEK can be mechanistic 
in the sense of Illaris and Williamson’s (2012) criteria from the last section. In con-
trast, Mackison’s heuristics do not satisfy Illari and Williamson’s core criterion of 
responsibility as they identify descriptors that can be used as indicators for the target 
phenomenon of herring behavior but do not include assumptions about how (and 
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whether) the former is responsible for the latter. Of course, some informants may 
combine descriptors such as moon phase or weather conditions with accounts of 
their causal contribution to the target phenomenon. However, the successful appli-
cation of the heuristics does not require such accounts and can also be embedded 
in belief systems that develop very different explanations of regularities. For exam-
ple, a heuristic that relates brightness of the moon and packing density of herring 
shoals could be effective while being embedded in very different causal stories in 
TEK that strongly differ from AEK by being framed in terms of intentional actions 
of the moon.
Mackinson’s case illustrates the importance of TEK that is not mechanistic in 
character because it aims for patterns and regularities at the macro-level without 
attempting to explain how a target phenomenon is produced through the organiza-
tion of sub-components. The importance of this knowledge about dynamics of eco-
systems at the macro-level is acknowledged by Mackinson and constitutes his main 
motivation for integrating local knowledge in AEK about herring shoals. Given “our 
incomplete understanding of biological and ecological mechanisms underpinning 
behavioral responses of fish” (Mackinson 2000: 533), it is often not feasible to build 
predictive models exclusively on the basis of mechanistic analyses. At the same 
time, predictive modeling is needed for purposes of conservation and fishery man-
agement. The expert system CLUPEX aims to solve this problem of insufficiently 
understood ecological complexity by circumventing questions about mechanisms 
and by building a predictive model on the basis of regularities and patterns at the 
macro-level.
Both the problem and the solution are well-known to holders of TEK whose live-
lihoods depend on interactions with complex ecosystems and who often have to 
make rapid decisions on how to interact with their environments during fishing and 
other daily activities. Intricate models of the organization of productive sub-compo-
nents in the sense of Illari and Williamson can be feasible in some situations such as 
Balinese rice farming where TEK institutions invest considerable resources to moni-
tor and reorganize relevant entities and activities such as dams and cropping sched-
ules. However, this does not mean that mechanistic perspectives will always provide 
the most successful strategies for dealing with complex ecological systems in TEK. 
Heuristics that circumvent issues of underlying mechanisms will often be preferable 
in applied contexts such as conservation management and are widely employed in 
TEK.
Holism in TEK heuristics
While Mackinson’s case study indicates limitations of mechanistic interpretations 
of TEK, it is less clear that it provides a substantive illustration of its holistic char-
acter. Indeed, the notion of holism is ambiguous and has been historically used to 
articulate a large variety of positions from strong anti-materialist theories to meth-
odological programs that emphasize limitations of decompositional analysis without 
being committed to wholes as metaphysically distinct from their composing parts 
(Allen 2017). Holism in the more restricted methodological sense aims “to account 
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for living processes as functioning wholes” (Allen 2017: 61) and rejects require-
ments of mechanistic analysis or even reduction in scientific practice (see also Lud-
wig 2012; Harrington 1999; Zahle and Collin 2014). Such a more restricted meth-
odological interpretation of holism can also be applied to Mackinson’s case study as 
his examples illustrate that holders of TEK often address ecosystems “as functioning 
wholes” that exhibit relevant patterns and regularities while avoiding decomposi-
tional approaches of mechanistic or even reductionistic analysis.
Even if such a restricted methodological interpretation can be applied to Mack-
inson’s case study, “holism” in the context of TEK is commonly associated with 
wider metaphysical, spiritual, and ethical aspects of Indigenous worldviews. Char-
acterizations of TEK as holistic do not only point to a methodology of investigat-
ing ecosystems as “functioning wholes” but rather to more general relational beliefs 
and practices of holders of TEK (Ingold 2006; Kovach 2010; Mika 2015; Shroff 
2011). For example, Cajete’s influential Native Science characterizes Indigenous 
holism in terms of a general commitment to interrelatedness: “Humans are but one 
manifestation of an implicate universal order. All parts of this order interpenetrate 
one another. They are holistically codependent—‘we are all related.’’ (2000: 208). 
Appeals to interrelatedness in Indigenous holisms have entangled metaphysical, 
spiritual, and ethical meanings. “We are all related” is partly a causal claim about 
mutual influences but it is more than just propositional knowledge about connec-
tions between people and the land. For example, Ingold has influentially stressed 
relational perspectives in TEK as practices and skills of interacting with local envi-
ronments: “For local people […] traditional knowledge is inseparable from actual 
practices of inhabiting the land. For it is in the relationships that are forged with the 
land, along with its animal and plant life, that their knowledge is generated” (Ingold 
and Kurttila 2000: 186).
Finally, relational perspectives do not only affect spiritual relations with the land 
from ancestral grounds to totemism (Viveiros de Castro 2012; Descola 2015) but are 
also materialized in moral practices of mutual responsibility and respect. As Shroff 
(2011: 53) puts it: “The holistic concept of social, psychological interconnectivity is 
a central aspect of Indigeneity. […] Concepts of interconnectivity within Indigenous 
ways of knowing translate into various values: relationships with others and self and 
ultimately to helping others and being of service.” Mackinson’s case study does not 
illustrate this wider interpretation of holism in the sense practices that emphasize 
metaphysical, spiritual, and ethical interrelatedness. On the contrary, his heuristics 
are clearly not holistic in this wider sense as they isolate propositional knowledge 
about very specific macro-regularities that allow modelling of equally specific eco-
logical phenomena independently of Indigenous worldviews of interrelatedness.
While specific heuristics in the sense of Mackinson’s case study are important 
for holders of TEK in contexts such as sustainable fishing or forest management, 
it would be a misunderstanding to assume that the holism of TEK is exhausted 
by the identification of patterns and regularities of ecosystems “as functioning 
wholes”. On the contrary, characterizations of TEK as holistic typically reflect 
the entanglement of ecological knowledge with wider worldviews and practices 
of interrelatedness. To address the role of this wider holism in local heuristics, 
it is helpful to look beyond Mackinson’s case study of specific IF … THEN 
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clauses. For example, Berkes’ discussion of Cree hunting practices builds on a 
much more in-depth attempt to situate epistemic practices in the Cree worldview 
“from the inside” (2018: 98). Berkes identifies three elements of Cree TEK that 
contrast with perspectives that are dominant in AEK. First, animals and not hunt-
ers control the hunt. Partly reflecting on the cyclical nature of animal abundance 
in Arctic and Subarctic regions (e.g. caribou, beaver, marten, porcupine), Cree 
emphasize the agency of animals in making (or not making) themselves available. 
Second, hunters and fishers are obligated to show respect to animals. Given the 
agency of animals in the hunting process, respect (e.g. in tracking, killing, butch-
ering, and consuming) is a central requirement for engagement. Third, continu-
ous use of resources is necessary for maintenance of hunting grounds. Excessive 
hunting and neglect of hunting grounds are equally harmful extremes that need to 
be avoided through continued and respectful forms of use.
Berkes’ analysis of Chisasibi Cree hunting of caribou emphasizes the importance 
of these general elements of Cree worldview in shaping rules of engagement. For 
example, issues of respect took the centre stage for Chisasibi Cree with the sud-
den reappearance and subsequent disappearance of large numbers of caribou of 
the George River herd. The population size of the George River herd has fluctu-
ated between 5000 and 776,000 members through the twentieth century (Gunn et al. 
2011) and reached a historic low by the end of the 1970s. Berkes focuses on a period 
in the 1980s that started with the return of a large number of caribou to the land of 
Chisasibi Cree in 1982–1983 but was followed by a sharp drop in 1984–1985 after 
an unregulated hunt that was perceived as violating the traditional agreements of 
respect between Chisasibi Cree and caribou. Chisasibi elders reacted to this devel-
opment by reminding the community of its core rules and responsibilities. Many of 
these rules can be formulated as IF … THEN clauses. The caribou hunt is going to 
be successful again in the coming years only if, Chisasibi hunters (a) pay respect 
to the Caribou, (b) do not kill more Caribou than needed for use, (c) do not let car-
casses rot, and so on.
Rules in Berkes’ case study may be called heuristics in the broad sense of epistemic 
tools that guide engagement with target phenomena. At the same time, these rules 
clearly differ from both Poliseli (2018) and Mackinson’s (2000) heuristics. Poliseli 
et al.’s heuristics are epistemic tools that generate ecological understanding by facili-
tating the identification of underlying mechanisms. Berkes’ rules have a very different 
structure as they guide sustainable practices without aiming for a mechanistic analysis. 
For example, a mechanistic model may attempt to specify the causal effects of differ-
ent hunting practices on the population cycles and size of caribou herds. This would 
require differentiating the effects of hunting from other factors such as availability of 
winter food sources such as lichen, prevalence of other predators, harshness of winter, 
habitat destruction and pollution, and so on. While there has been some understand-
ing of the contributions of these factors, Berkes points out that scientists have not been 
able to construct a predictive model and “caribou population increases and decreases 
are a scientific problem yet unresolved” (2018: 134). Despite the lack of mechanistic 
explanation of caribou population cycles, Chisasibi need to engage with these cycles 
(and many other complex ecological phenomena) in a sustainable way. General rules of 
engagement and respect provide a strategy for shaping sustainable interactions without 
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requiring detailed knowledge of how the organization of different sub-components pro-
duces population cycles.
While Berkes’ (2018) and Mackinson’s (2000) heuristics can both be described as 
non-mechanistic, there are also important differences between them. Mackinson’s heu-
ristics provide very specific IF … THEN clauses that isolate relations between equally 
specific ecological phenomena such as a weather condition and the packing density of 
herring shoals. In contrast, many rules in Chisasibi hunting are much more general in 
character and remain applicable where neither underlying mechanisms nor specific pre-
dictive IF … THEN clauses are available. Characterizing these rules as holistic is not 
only a matter of a particular epistemic strategy that focuses on dynamics of ecosystems 
at the macro-level rather than the organization of its sub-components. Instead, Chisa-
sibi rules of hunting caribous are holistic in the sense that they are entangled with gen-
eral elements of Chisasibi worldview and way of life. On the one hand, more general 
aspects of Chisasibi worldview such as the agency of animals shape the character of the 
rules that employed during hunting of caribou. On the other hand, rules of engagement 
with caribou and other animals have shaped Chisasibi worldview over the course of 
many generations. In other words, norms of hunting and general elements of Chisa-
sibi worldview shape each other in a way that undermines attempts to isolate epistemic 
aspects from wider ethical, spiritual, and metaphysical components of Cree perspec-
tives on environments. While philosophers of science often think of holism largely in 
terms of non-reductionistic or non-mechanististic methodologies, it is precisely this 
wider metaphysical, spiritual, and ethical entanglement that many Indigenous research-
ers have in mind when characterizing their perspectives as holistic (Cajete 2000; Wil-
son 2008). For the latter, the core is not the employment of a specific epistemic strategy 
but rather that the very divide between epistemic strategies and ways of life is artificial 
in TEK.
To sum up, this section has argued that holders of TEK employ a diverse toolbox 
of mechanistic and non-mechanistic heuristics. Thinking of heuristics broadly as epis-
temic tools that guide engagement with target phenomena, different ecological case 
studies lead to different types of heuristics. The last section emphasized that holders of 
TEK can identify and intervene on mechanisms but not all heuristics in TEK contribute 
to mechanistic accounts of the organization of entities and activities that are responsi-
ble for target phenomena. First, Mackinson’s (2000) discussion of local fishing knowl-
edge documents heuristics that relate ecological phenomena at the macro-level without 
requiring decompositional accounts of mechanisms. Second, Berkes’ (2018) discussion 
of Chisasibi Cree TEK documents heuristics that guide hunting independently of the 
identification of underlying mechanisms or specific macro-regularities. TEK therefore 
includes highly heterogeneous set of mechanistic and holistic heuristics that can guide 
engagement with local environments under diverse epistemic and pragmatic conditions.
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Conclusion: relating knowledge systems beyond the mechanism–
holism divide
This article started with the common criticism of a “divide between Indigenous and 
scientific knowledge” (Agrawal 1995) as creating artificial boundaries and thereby 
contributing to the marginalization of the former. To some degree, our discussion 
can be framed within this wider critique as it suggests two shortcomings of a sim-
ple mechanism–holism divide between TEK and AEK. First, generic characteriza-
tions of TEK as holistic obscure the diversity of its epistemic resources. Holders of 
TEK are perfectly capable of identifying and intervening in mechanisms of complex 
ecological phenomena such as the agroecological system of Balinese rice farming. 
Second, holistic elements are not exclusive to TEK and a characterization of AEK 
as entirely mechanistic also runs the risk of obscuring the diversity of its epistemic 
resources. At least holism in the more restricted methodological sense often plays 
an important role for successful engagement with complexity and uncertainty in 
AEK. Ecological phenomena are commonly shaped by a large number of insuffi-
ciently understood variables and feedback loops that limit the prospects of predic-
tive modelling through mechanistic analysis. This is explicitly acknowledged both 
in Mackinson’s (2000) and Berkes’ (2018) incorporation of TEK into AEK and con-
verges with more general debates about the limitations of mechanistic perspectives 
in philosophy of biology (Braillard and Malaterre 2015; Dupré 2013; Halina 2017; 
Woodward 2013). In other words: Mechanistic approaches are relevant in TEK and 
AEK without exhausting the epistemic resources of either of them.
Recognizing the inadequacy of a simple mechanism–holism divide matters for 
entangled epistemological and political reasons. Epistemologically, a simple con-
trast between holistic TEK and mechanistic AEK obscures the complexity of both 
knowledge systems in practice. In contrast with such a simple divide, this article 
has aimed to develop a more adequate account that acknowledges mechanistic 
and non-mechanistic features of epistemic practices beyond generic labeling of 
TEK and AEK as either holistic or mechanistic. While our discussion has mostly 
focused on these epistemological issues, it is important to acknowledge their 
entanglement with applied and political questions about the status of TEK. First, 
bringing the resources of mechanistic philosophy of science into debates about 
TEK is not only theoretically intriguing but helps to clarify epistemic resources 
that have often been neglected and led to the marginalization of holders of TEK 
in practice. Lansing’s Balinese case study provides a powerful illustration of this 
practical significance as the neglect of Balinese TEK in the wake of the Green 
Revolution led to pest outbreaks and water shortages with catastrophic conse-
quences for local farmers. Second, it is equally important to avoid a reduction of 
TEK to its mechanistic resources as substantial parts of TEK cannot be isolated 
from the wider worldview and way of life local communities. Taking TEK seri-
ously therefore also requires to look beyond its potential contribution to mecha-
nistic analysis and to recognize its entanglement with holistic reasoning in TEK.
While this article has criticized a simple mechanism–holism divide, our intro-
duction contrasted the problem of division with a problem of assimilation that 
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downplays the unique (cultural, ethical, metaphysical, methodological, social, 
spiritual…) aspects of TEK for the sake of integration with AEK (El-Hani and 
de Ferreira Bandeira 2008; Ludwig 2016; Nadasdy 2003). And indeed, the analy-
sis of this article is not limited to a rejection of the mechanism–holism divide 
but can also be used for a more fine-grained description of differences between 
epistemic resources in TEK and AEK. Rather than using generic characteriza-
tions of knowledge systems as “holistic” or “mechanistic”, we have argued for a 
heterogenous toolbox of heuristics with diverse mechanistic and holistic features. 
Although this general analysis applies to both TEK and AEK, a more detailed 
analysis of the application of heuristics in practice will also uncover substantial 
differences.
Even if both AEK and TEK can involve the identification of mechanisms, heuris-
tics in AEK are commonly shaped by methodological requirements and standards 
of scientific research that strongly differ from those employed in TEK. For exam-
ple, Poliseli (2018) heuristic of Evidence Frequency aims to identify causal rela-
tions between components on the basis of probabilistic and mechanistic evidence 
from various sources. While it may be possible to locate this general epistemic strat-
egy in some contexts of TEK, Poliseli (2018) also specify this heuristic in terms 
of strategies such as analytic and synthetic analysis, forward and backward chain-
ing, graphs and indexes that are largely specific to academically institutionalized 
research. Speaking more generally, heuristics in AEK are shaped by methods and 
standards (e.g. of experimentation, modelling, and quantification) that clearly differ 
from methods and standards that shape practices in TEK (see also Marlor 2010). 
One does not need a general mechanism–holism divide to acknowledge these differ-
ences in a more fine-grained account of the relations between epistemic strategies in 
AEK and TEK.
Furthermore, not only heuristics in AEK but also in TEK often involve unique 
aspects that need to be acknowledged in a more fine-grained comparison of epis-
temic strategies. For example, AEK commonly employs epistemic strategies that are 
holistic in the sense of addressing dynamics of ecosystems at the macro-level while 
avoiding mechanistic decomposition in terms of productively organized entities and 
activities. However, we argued in the context of Berkes’ case study of Caribou that 
many heuristics in TEK need to be understood as holistic in much wider sense of 
being entangled with the ethics, worldview, and way of life of Indigenous and other 
local communities. Of course, AEK is also entangled with values and worldviews of 
Western researchers and wider issues of interrelatedness are not exclusive to TEK. 
At the same time, Berkes discussion makes it very clear that many Cree heuristics 
are very different from heuristics that are employed by AEK as they are shaped by 
unique metaphysical beliefs (e.g. animals deciding to be caught) and values (e.g. 
how to respect a caribou) of Chisasibi Cree worldview. Even if AEK is not exclu-
sively mechanistic, holistic heuristics in TEK will often be clearly distinguished 
from AEK heuristics in how they integrate metaphysical, spiritual, and ethical com-
mitments of traditional communities.
The rejection of a simple mechanism–holism divide does therefore not collapse 
differences between AEK and TEK but provides opportunities to locate differences 
in more specific practices. Holders of AEK and TEK both employ diverse epistemic 
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toolboxes that include mechanistic and holistic strategies but that does not imply 
that they are using identical strategies. Locating both similarities and differences in 
specific practices beyond a simple mechanism–holism divide is not only an interest-
ing theoretical task for philosophy of science but can contribute to epistemologi-
cally and politically more adequate practices of co-creation. Understanding simi-
larities (both through mechanistic resources of TEK and holistic aspects of AEK) 
is important for finding common ground in co-creation and avoiding an artificial 
divide between knowledge systems. Understanding differences (both in quantitative 
and qualitative characteristics of heuristics) is important for taking the unique char-
acteristics of TEK seriously and avoiding its inadequate assimilation into academic 
research.
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